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SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER FOR NEGLIGENCE
SUITS—WHY COMMERCIAL SPACE OPERATORS
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
TO SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
ANDREA REED*
INTRODUCTION
THE COMMERCIAL SPACE transportation industry isquickly approaching a critical milestone: the first paying
customers traveling to space. After a decade of setbacks, the tide
is finally turning for major commercial space transportation
companies, and 2020 may finally be the breakout year for the
private space transportation industry. In December 2018, Virgin
Galactic made history by completing a successful crewed test of
SpaceShipTwo, the first vehicle specifically built for commercial
passenger travel to reach space.1 Other companies are not far
behind if they meet their target launch dates—a perpetual “big
if” for the industry. SpaceX plans to complete a commercial
crew demonstration flight of its Dragon vehicle by fall 2019.2
Blue Origin plans to launch a crewed test flight of its New Shep-
ard reusable rocket and capsule in 2019 after several successful
tests returning the components safely to Earth.3 Both Virgin Ga-
* Andrea C. Reed, J.D. Candidate 2020, Southern Methodist University,
Dedman School of Law; B.A. International Relations, Michigan State University;
M.A. Communication, Wake Forest University. I would like to thank Professor
Tom Mayo for his advice on this project, best summarized by his reference to
Yogi Berra’s famous quote, “When you come to a fork in the road, take it.” Thank
you also to my family for their support and feedback throughout the writing
process.
1 Sarah Scoles, The WIRED Guide to Commercial Human Space Flight, WIRED (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-commercial-space-flight/
[https://perma.cc/QUY8-7YRA].
2 Eric Berger, After Thursday Test Firing, SpaceX May Be a Month from Commercial
Crew Launch, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 24, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/science/
2019/01/after-thursday-test-firing-spacex-may-be-a-month-from-commercial-crew-
launch/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9S-2UA9].
3 Trevor Mogg, Blue Origin’s Latest Mission Shows How Space Tourism Might Look,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 23, 2019), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/space-
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lactic and Blue Origin claim to be “close to launching commer-
cial services.”4 Richard Branson, founder and chairman of
Virgin Galactic, plans to be the company’s first civilian passen-
ger—this year.5 Over 700 people already hold tickets to travel
into orbit with Virgin Galactic alone.6 Additionally, SpaceX and
Boeing hope to soon begin launching NASA astronauts into or-
bit under contracts to transport the U.S. government’s astro-
nauts to the International Space Station.7 The Moon will also
soon be within reach—SpaceX plans to send a group of artists
and a Japanese billionaire to the dark side of the Moon and
back in 2023.8 Blue Origin also is racing to make it there by the
same year.9
The future of private travel to space is bright, and ideally, ac-
cess to space will not be limited to the extremely wealthy. Space
travel should be accessible to researchers and scientists, teachers
and students, and not just eccentric billionaires and celebri-
ties.10 Unfortunately, the current liability regime governing
commercial space travel inadequately protects private citizens’
safety and financial interests. Federal law requires passengers to
waive any claim they may have for injury or death caused by a
commercial space operator’s negligence.11 This policy places al-
most all of the risks of traveling to space on the passenger. A
commercial operator only bears liability for injury to or death of
private passengers for intentional, willful, or wanton conduct, as
defined by state liability statutes.12 Regulators and courts must




5 Jonathan O’Callaghan, 2019 Is the Year that Space Tourism Finally Becomes a




8 Scoles, supra note 1.
9 Id.
10 A long list of celebrities have purchased tickets from Virgin Galactic, includ-
ing Leonardo DiCaprio, Tom Hanks, Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie, Russell Brand,
Lady Gaga, Katy Perry, Justin Bieber, and Ashton Kutcher. Dennis Green, Celebri-
ties Aren’t Bailing on Virgin Galactic After Crash, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2014), https:/
/www.businessinsider.com/celebrities-arent-bailing-on-virgin-2014-11 [https://
perma.cc/4QXT-TQJT].
11 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b) (Supp. | 2016).
12 See, e.g., Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Manage-
ment in the Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. &
COM. 371, 381 (2009).
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but also the industry from the type of widespread public back-
lash that doomed the zeppelin industry to the trash can of
history.13
This Comment proposes that traditional state negligence
principles should govern the liability regime between commer-
cial space operators and private passengers. Congressionally-
mandated cross-waivers of liability and other state and federal
laws form a complex regulatory web that shifts risk from opera-
tors onto passengers. Private citizens should not bear the risk of
injury or death when an accident is due to the operator’s negli-
gence. Part I lays out the historical development of the federal
regulations that form the current liability regime for commer-
cial space operators. Part II analyzes and critiques the principal
federal liability statute and the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015’s provisions that affect the distribu-
tion of risk between operators and passengers, including cross-
waivers of liability and informed consent provisions. Part III
charts the state statutes that govern the content of liability waiv-
ers between operators and passengers, highlighting the gaps
and contradictions between federal and state laws. Part IV pro-
poses regulatory changes that would allow traditional state negli-
gence doctrines to govern the duties and standards of care owed
by private space operators to their passengers—a solution to the
patchwork of state and federal laws that create legal uncertainty
for a growing industry. Part V concludes with recommendations
for short-term and long-term changes to federal law to transition
that a fair and equitable liability regime for private passengers
and commercial operators.
I. BACKGROUND
In his 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan an-
nounced his support for the burgeoning U.S. commercial space
transportation industry, emphasizing that private efforts would
eventually eclipse the capabilities of NASA and other govern-
13 The collapse of the zeppelin industry serves as a cautionary tale for the com-
mercial space industry. The Hindenburg’s infamous flight was supposed to usher
in the era of the airship, but as the “first massive technological disaster caught on
film . . . the scene became embedded in the public’s consciousness,” instead
bringing the age to an abrupt end. See Jessie Szalay, Hindenburg Crash: The End of
Airship Travel, LIVE SCI. (May 3, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/58959-hin
denburg-crash.html [https://perma.cc/FVP7-R43M].
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ments.14 Congress soon passed the Commercial Space Launch
Act of 1984, which governs the licensing, safety, and manage-
ment of commercial launches and vests regulatory authority in
the Department of Transportation (DOT).15 Commercial capa-
bilities quickly matured, making private space transportation a
question of “when,” not “if.” In 2004, Congress amended the
Act’s statutory definitions to create a new legal classification for
private citizens, the “space flight participant.”16 Current law de-
fines “space flight participant” as “an individual, who is not crew
or a government astronaut, carried within a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle.”17 Federal law subjects this new category of per-
sons to different rules and regulations than those that protect
government astronauts and the crews of commercial space trans-
portation operators.18 Most recently, Congress enacted the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015
(CSLCA),19 amending the liability-related provisions to insulate
operators from legal responsibility for the bodily injury or death
of a space flight participant (SFP) during a launch.20
14 JOHN THUNE, U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT, S. REP.
NO. 114-88, at 1 (2015).
15 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
Within the DOT, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) now oversees these
regulations. THUNE, supra note 14, at 2.
16 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492,
§ 2(b), 118 Stat. 3974, 3975 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 70102 (2004))
(current version at 51 U.S.C. § 50902(20) (Supp. | 2016)).
17 51 U.S.C. § 50902(20) (Supp. | 2016). “Crew” refers to an employee of an
operator (and its contractors or subcontractors) who performs tasks relating to
the launch, reentry, or operation of a vehicle. Id. § 50902(2) (2012). In 2015,
Congress amended the Act to create the new category of “government astronaut”
to further differentiate classes of persons participating in a commercial space
flight. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
§ 112(c), 129 Stat. 704, 711–12 (2015) (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (Supp. |
2016)). “Government astronaut” refers to an individual designated as such by
NASA, operating in the course of his or her employment, and who is either an
employee of the U.S. government or is an “international partner astronaut.” 51
U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2012).
18 The FAA defines “operator” as the “holder of a license or permit under 51
U.S.C. Subtitle V, chapter 509.” 14 C.F.R. § 401.5 (2015). Chapter 509, titled
“Commercial Space Launch Activities,” refers to operators using the terms “licen-
see” and “transferee.” See 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923. This Comment will use the
FAA’s terminology of “operator.”
19 Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015). This Comment will refer to the
CSLCA of 2015 and all previous enactments still in force as the “Act.” References
cited herein may refer to the Act as the “Spurring Private Aerospace Competitive-
ness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015” (SPACE Act of 2015), an alternate name
for Title I of the CSLCA. See id. § 101.
20 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b) (Supp. | 2016).
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II. FEDERAL REGULATIONS SHIELD COMMERCIAL
OPERATORS FROM LIABILITY AT THE EXPENSE
OF SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
Three main provisions of the Act form the liability regime
protecting commercial operators from the financial risks associ-
ated with private space transportation: (1) a three-tiered indem-
nification regime; (2) cross-waivers of liability between the
operator and other entities; and (3) informed consent require-
ments for space flight participants.21 Though this Comment fo-
cuses on how the second and third provisions shield operators
from liability for SFP safety, the indemnification provisions war-
rant a brief discussion to illustrate the substantial financial sup-
port operators also receive from the government.
Congress created the commercial space operator indemnifica-
tion regime in 1988 under the initial act as a form of risk shar-
ing, similar to federal indemnification regimes for other high-
risk, high-cost industries, such as nuclear power plants.22 Under
the first tier, operators must purchase insurance or demonstrate
financial responsibility for all losses up to the “maximum proba-
ble loss,” capped at $500 million per launch for third-party
claims and $100 million for claims by the U.S. government.23
Under the second tier, the U.S. government indemnifies the op-
erator and assumes financial responsibility for paying third-party
claims in excess of the operator’s first-tier coverage up to $3 bil-
lion.24 Under the third tier, liability reverts back to the operator
in the event that claims exceed the amount covered by the first
two tiers.25 The operator’s insurance policy must cover, “to the
extent of their potential liability,” government personnel, the
operator’s contractors, subcontractors, customers and their con-
tractors, and SFPs.26 The statutory requirement to cover SFPs
21 Id. §§ 50905(b)(5), 50914(a)–(b), 50915(a).
22 Matthew Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International Negotiations
Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the U.S. Commercial Space Industry,
33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 235 (2015).
23 51 U.S.C. § 50914(a)(1)–(3) (2012). The maximum probable loss for a
launch is calculated by the Secretary of Transportation in consultation with the
Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of the Air Force. Id. § 50914(a)(2).
24 Id. § 50915(a). The statute provides indemnification of $1.5 billion, amount-
ing to approximately $3 billion as of October 2017 when adjusted for inflation.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: FAA EVALUATION OF COMMERCIAL
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT SAFETY FRAMEWORKS AND KEY INDUSTRY INDICATORS, at 8–9
(2017) [hereinafter FAA EVALUATION].
25 FAA EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 8–9.
26 51 U.S.C. § 50914(a)(4) (Supp. | 2016).
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under the operator’s first-tier insurance policy expires on Sep-
tember 30, 2025.27
A. LIABILITY CROSS-WAIVERS SHIFT THE BURDEN OF NEARLY
ALL RISKS TO THE SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANT
Cross-waivers of liability are the second component of the
Act’s liability regime. All licenses require the operator to exe-
cute reciprocal waivers of claims with all “applicable parties” in-
volved in activities under the license.28 The waiver must state
that each party “agrees to be responsible for personal injury to,
death of, or property damage or loss sustained by” the party.29
Applicable parties to the cross-waiver are the operator’s contrac-
tors and customers, the customer’s contractors, and SFPs (inclu-
sion of SFPs in this provision also expires on September 30,
2025).30 The Secretary of Transportation must issue cross-waiv-
ers of liability on behalf of the government with operators and
with SFPs under similar terms.31
Though the Act’s cross-waiver provision requires the SFP to
execute reciprocal waivers with both the operator and the gov-
ernment, the rules promulgated by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) only detail the substantive requirements for the
waiver between the SFP and the government.32 Regardless of
fault, the SFP must agree to: (1) waive and release all claims
against the U.S. government for injury sustained during the li-
censed activity; (2) assume responsibility for injury resulting
from licensed activity; (3) hold harmless the United States for
injury; and (4) hold harmless and indemnify the United States
“from and against liability, loss, or damage arising out of claims
brought by anyone for property damage or bodily injury sus-
tained by the space flight participant, resulting from licensed or
permitted activities.”33 The reciprocal waiver provides that the
United States agrees to, regardless of fault: (1) waive and release
27 Id. § 50914(a)(5).
28 Id. § 50914(b)(1).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. § 50914(b)(2). The government’s cross-waivers only apply to the extent
that losses exceed the insurance obtained by the operator under the first tier of
the indemnification. Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 460.49 (2007).
32 See 14 C.F.R. § 440.17 (2016). The text of the rule specifies that an SFP must
enter into a reciprocal waiver agreement with the government for “each licensed
or permitted activity in which the United States or its contractors and subcontrac-
tors are involved.” Id. § 440.17(d).
33 Id. § 440.17(d)(1)(iv).
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claims it may have against the SFP for property damage; (2) as-
sume responsibility for damage it sustains from licensed activi-
ties to the extent that claims exceed the operator’s first-tier
insurance policy; and (3) extend the requirements of the waiver
and release of claims against SFPs to the government’s contrac-
tors and subcontractors.34
These provisions in the government’s cross-waiver substan-
tially reduce the liability insurance benefit SFPs gain from inclu-
sion as a covered party under the indemnification regime. The
operator’s first-tier insurance policy only covers claims by the
government and third parties for losses caused by the SFP,35 but
the cross-waiver releases any claim the government can bring
against the SFP. In practice, the wavier would thus decreases the
amount of coverage the operator must purchase because the
government has released claims for losses against SPFs. The SFP
loses the benefit of the operator’s insurance coverage at the
high price of assuming all risk of injury or loss the SFP may in-
cur due to fault of the government. The indemnification re-
gime, absent the SFP–government waiver, would shift some of
the financial risks of SFP flight activity back to the operator to
insure.
Cross-waivers also face a host of practical legal problems. First,
FAA rules specify that federal law governs cross-waivers between
the government and SFPs.36 During the notice and comment pe-
riod for Part 440, a DOT-appointed risk management attorney
raised concern that states may strike down the cross-waivers as
“contrary to public policy” if state law were to govern the federal
government’s waivers.37 To resolve the risk that a state court
might hold a waiver agreement void, the FAA’s final rule states
that “United States Federal law” governs.38 However, this solu-
34 Id. § 440.17(d)(2). These three provisions are stipulations in the govern-
ment’s waiver that mirror the SFP waiver; however, the full waiver contains addi-
tional stipulations. See id.
35 51 U.S.C. § 50914(a)(1) (2012).
36 14 C.F.R. pt. 440 app. E § 7(c) (2012).
37 Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants,
71 Fed. Reg. 75,616, 75,628 (Dec. 15, 2006) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 440 app. E).
The final rule discusses supplemental materials documenting important differ-
ences across state laws compiled by Tracey Knutson. Id. In 2007, Knutson was
appointed to the DOT’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
and sat on the risk management committee. See Tracey’s Bio, KNUTSON & ASSOCI-
ATES, https://www.traceyknutson.com/traceys_bio.html [https://perma.cc/
G6XL-XFZM] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
38 14 C.F.R. pt. 440 app. E § 7(c).
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tion created a new problem—there is no general federal tort
law. The House Report accompanying the CSLCA concedes
there is a gap in substantive federal law in this area “absent a
more defined statutory framework for the Federal courts to ad-
judicate such claims.”39 Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
flatly explained “there is no Federal civil tort law that would ap-
ply to commercial space launch providers.”40 The preamble to
the FAA rule provides no solution to this problem.
Second, this lack of applicable body of tort law creates legal
uncertainty over the waiver’s limitations. The federal cross-waiv-
ers provide an exception to claims for bodily injury or property
damage “resulting from willful misconduct of any of the parties
to the reciprocal waiver.”41 Without any guiding federal law, par-
ties cannot know how courts will interpret the “willful miscon-
duct” exception. If the scope of the government’s liability waiver
to SFPs is unknown, SFPs may be unable to procure their own
private insurance. Underwriters cannot reasonably develop pol-
icy coverage and terms without knowing the circumstances
under which the government may be responsible for risks,
rather than the SFP as policy holder.
These legal provisions governing the SFP–government cross-
waiver do not apply to the cross-waivers between SFPs and opera-
tors. The Act mandates that the operator make a reciprocal
waiver of claims with all “applicable parties,” defined to include
SFPs;42 however, the FAA has not promulgated any rules gov-
erning the substantive or procedural requirements of the
SFP–operator cross-waiver.43 The Act’s only relevant provision
establishes venue for litigation, vesting exclusive jurisdiction in
federal courts for claims by an SFP for death or bodily injury.44
Unlike the choice-of-law provision mandating that federal law
governs SFP–government cross-waivers, the SFP–operator cross-
waivers would be litigated under state law in federal court. The
CSLCA’s House Report directly states that “it is not the intent”
of Congress “to preempt state tort law” from governing liability
39 H.R. REP. NO. 114-119, at 28 (2015), as reprinted in 2015 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234,
255.
40 Id. at 70 (minority view by Rep. Johnson).
41 14 C.F.R. § 440.17(f) (2016).
42 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b)(1) (Supp. | 2016).
43 See id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 460.45–460.49 (2007).
44 51 U.S.C. § 50914(g) (Supp. | 2016).
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between SFPs and operators.45 The SFP–operator waiver thus
avoids the substantive gap in federal tort law that plagues the
government’s cross-waivers but only by running headlong into
the original problem raised during notice and comment for the
SFP–government waiver rule—different state law approaches
create the risk that some waivers will be upheld while others are
struck down. The lack of guidance from the FAA about this
waiver all but ensures a patchwork of liability rules for both SFPs
and operators.
B. FEDERAL INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS COMPLICATE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
WHILE PROVIDING LITTLE PROTECTION FOR
THE INDUSTRY
The Act’s third requirement mandates that SFPs provide writ-
ten informed consent to the operator in order to participate in
activities under the launch license. Congress considers space
transportation “inherently risky,” and the informed consent re-
quirement reflects its desire that SFPs receive risk-related infor-
mation prior to participating in a launch.46 The Act states that
an operator may only launch with an SFP if in writing: (1) the
operator informs the SFP of the risks of space travel, including
the safety record of the launch vehicle; (2) the operator informs
the SFP that the federal government has not certified the
launch vehicle as safe, prior to receiving compensation or agree-
ing to fly; and (3) the SFP provides consent to participate in the
launch and agrees to any medical or training requirements
prior to launch, if issued by the Secretary of Transportation.47
The FAA promulgated a detailed list of information that an op-
erator must disclose to SFPs to fulfill its informed consent obli-
gations under its launch license.48 During the notice and
comment period, major space operators expressed concern that
some requirements lacked clear definitions and standards, rais-
45 H.R. REP. NO. 114-119, at 28 (further stating “the intent of the Committee is
to prohibit preemption and instruct the Courts to apply state substantive law to
resolve claims”).
46 Id. at 16; see also 51 U.S.C. § 50901(12) (2012).
47 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(5)–(6) (Supp. | 2016).
48 14 C.F.R. § 460.45 (2007).
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ing the likelihood of litigation over the scope of the informed
consent provision.49
This legal uncertainty persists for the industry, despite Con-
gress’s intent that although the informed consent requirements
do not confer any legal “protection for the launch providers,”
they also are not subject to any “statutory enforcement.”50 At a
minimum, informed consent requirements may show Congress
intended that SFPs assume some of the risk of space travel.51
Assumption of risk can sometimes act as a “complete defense” to
a plaintiff’s claim, though courts may be unlikely to “absolve”
the industry of liability if its warnings are not sufficiently clear.52
At the same time, an FAA-commissioned study has interpreted
congressional intent in the Act as codifying a “duty to warn” for
operators.53 Not only might the warnings fail to add any protec-
tion from liability, they may create a separate legal duty owed by
the operator to SFPs, similar to the duty owed by adventure
sport operators to participants.54 Several courts recognize a
cause of action “claiming that an operator/provider breached
the duty to obtain informed consent and/or that a participant
has been deprived of informed consent.”55 Where statutes or
regulations “govern the amount of information that must be
given,” compliance with the statute can create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the operator gave proper informed consent.56
However, proving regulatory compliance could itself be legally
challenging, as the industry made very clear during the notice
49 See Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Partici-
pants, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,616, 75,624–25 (Dec. 15, 2006) (codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 460.45).
50 H.R. REP. NO. 114-119, at 16.
51 Tracey Knutson, What Is “Informed Consent” for Space-Flight Participants in the
Soon-to-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 J. SPACE L. 105, 119 (2007).
52 Id. at 121.
53 APT RESEARCH, INC., STUDY ON INFORMED CONSENT FOR SPACEFLIGHT PARTICI-




54 Id. at 9.
55 Id. at 10. Courts that recognize a cause of action for breach of the duty of
informed consent include the D.C. Circuit and state courts in Colorado, Missis-
sippi, New Jersey, and Oklahoma. Id. at 10 n.29.
56 Id. at 11 (citing Texas and Louisiana courts holding that compliance with a
statutorily defined warning creates a presumption of informed consent).
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and comment period for the final FAA rule.57 For example, the
FAA rule requires that operators inform SFPs of the “safety re-
cord of all launch or reentry vehicles that have carried one or
more persons on board, including U.S. government and private
sector vehicles.”58 Comments from Blue Origin and several
other companies requested that the FAA provide the industry all
data on U.S. government launches “to ensure an accurate and
impartial list, used equally by all operators.”59 The FAA re-
sponded only that it would “explor[e] available options” and
consider “developing a database,” but that operators were still
fully responsible for providing the full safety record required by
the rule.60 The FAA thus promulgated the final informed con-
sent rule with multiple interpretative concerns from the industry
still outstanding. Operators do not know what level of disclosure
will satisfy several of the requirements, since the FAA has not
provided further guidance on several key comments on the rule,
leaving courts the task of determining the scope of an operator’s
duty to provide informed consent.
Until the first accident happens and informed consent agree-
ments are finally tested in court, it is unclear how much legal
protection they provide the industry. These agreements will
likely be litigated in state negligence suits brought by SFPs. Part
III will discuss how these federal informed consent require-
ments could complicate these future suits against commercial
operators.
III. STATE LIABILITY REGIMES—A PATCHWORK OF
DOCTRINES UNABLE TO FULLY PROTECT SPACE
FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
State liability statutes fill the gap left by the lack of FAA rules
and regulations governing the substantive and procedural provi-
sions for cross-waivers between operators and SFPs. In support
of the law, Congress found that “participation of State govern-
ments in encouraging and facilitating private sector involvement
. . . is in the national interest and is of significant public bene-
fit.”61 The Act contains an express clause addressing the rela-
57 See Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Partici-
pants, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,616, 75,624–25 (Dec. 15, 2006) (codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 460.45).
58 Id. at 75,624 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 75,624–25.
60 Id. at 75,625.
61 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(9) (2012).
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tionship between federal and state law.62 This section sets a
federal floor for regulation of commercial operators but not a
ceiling, acknowledging that nothing prevents state regulations
“in addition to or more stringent than” any “law, regulation,
standard, or order” set by the Act.63
A handful of states have passed statutes addressing the scope
of liability between commercial operators and SFPs to fill the
federal regulatory gap.64 At least eight states directly address the
liability owed to space flight participants: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vir-
ginia.65 Some states, including Colorado, Florida, New Mexico,
Texas, and Virginia, are home to existing or developing space-
ports intended for commercial launches.66 Other states created
liability statutes to incentivize commercial space operators to lo-
cate their business in that state, bringing with them high-paying
jobs and new economic opportunities.67
Significant differences exist across these state liability regimes.
Every state provides some form of liability waiver for commercial
space operators, with the major differences by state summarized
in Table 1. With the exception of Arizona, each state statute sets
out the specific scope of liability, including any limitations.68 All
states exempt intentional injuries from the waiver (except for
Arizona), but from there, state liability models diverge.69 This
section will explore the various state provisions.
62 Id. § 50919(c).
63 Id.
64 Rachel A. Yates, State Law Limitations on the Liability of Spaceflight Operators, 9
SCITECH LAW. 14, 2 (2012).
65 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-558 (2016); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212 (West Supp.
2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-6-101 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501 (West
2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3 (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 352 (West Supp. 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 100A.002; VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.9 (2015).
66 Yates, supra note 64, at 1.
67 Meredith Blasingame, Comment, Nurturing the United States Commercial Space
Industry in an International World: Conflicting State, Federal, and International Law, 80
MISS. L.J. 741, 755–56 (2010).
68 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-558 (providing that a space flight entity may enter
into an agreement to limit liability with an SFP, without specifying how much
liability the agreement may waive).
69 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212; COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-6-101; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 331.501; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 352; TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 100A.002; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.9; Yates, supra
note 64, at 1.
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A. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR SPACE FLIGHT
PARTICIPANTS AGAINST OPERATOR NEGLIGENCE VARIES
BY STATE
The choice of language in a state’s statute determines what
duty an operator owes the SFP and defines the standard of care,
departure from which constitutes breach. Most state statutes ex-
empt any waiver of liability for a combination of gross negli-
gence and willful or wanton disregard of the safety standard.
California, Colorado, and Florida define gross negligence as a
separate standard from that of a willful or wanton act.78 The
Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma statutes contain a single stan-
dard, phrased as “gross negligence evidencing willful or wanton
70 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-558.
71 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212.
72 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-6-101.
73 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501.
74 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3.
75 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 352 (West Supp. 2018).
76 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 100A.002.
77 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.9 (2015).
78 All three states limit the waiver if an operator “[c]ommits an act or omission
that constitutes gross negligence or willful or wanton disregard for the safety” of
the participant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212(c)(1) (West Supp. 2019); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 41-6-10(1)(b)(I) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501(2)(b)(1).
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disregard” for participant safety.79 New Mexico is the only state
that does not use the term gross negligence, instead limiting the
waiver in the case of “willful, wanton or reckless disregard for
the safety of the participant.”80
How courts interpret these liability standards determines the
scope of the waiver. The Restatement (Third) of Torts explains
that “willful” misconduct often requires showing intentional
harm.81 “Wanton” misconduct is defined in terms of reckless-
ness.82 Reckless conduct occurs when: (1) the person knows of
the risk created by the conduct or “knows facts that make the
risk obvious to another in the person’s situation”; and (2) fails
to take precautions where the burdens imposed to reduce the
risk are “slight” relative to the magnitude of the risk.83 The com-
ments to the Restatement’s definition of recklessness suggests it
can include both a subjective standard (did the person actually
know of the risk) and an objective standard (would a similarly
situated person would find the risk obvious).84
The comments to the Restatement further suggest that com-
mon usage of these terms is not always precise; however, for
“gross negligence” to have any meaning distinct from “willful or
wanton” misconduct, it requires a definition that is less stringent
than recklessness but more stringent than regular negligence.85
Thus, the scope a waiver with a limitation for gross negligence or
willful or wanton disregard for safety should allow an SFP to
bring a claim against an operator without needing proof of in-
tent to harm. Still, in some states where courts interpret the
recklessness standard “as requiring the actor’s actual knowledge
of the danger,” the objective requirement, an SFP faces a high
burden.86 Recognizing this harsh position for plaintiffs, the Re-
statement suggests that “the obviousness of the danger can sup-
79 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 352(B)(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 100A.002(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.9(B)(1).
80 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 2.
84 Id. § 2 cmt. c.
85 Id. § 2 cmt. a. The term gross negligence “simply means negligence that is
especially bad,” which must refer to a standard weaker than recklessness, other-
wise “gross negligence” would be redundant with “willful or wanton” conduct. Id.
86 Id. § 2 cmt. c.
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port an inference of the person’s knowledge” when direct proof
may be unavailable.87
Since no private citizen has yet traveled to space with a com-
mercial operator, courts will be working from a blank slate when
eventually faced with adjudicating personal injury claims
brought by SFPs under these liability provisions.
B. WHETHER THE “DANGEROUS CONDITION” EXCEPTION
PROVIDES EXTRA PROTECTION FOR SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
DEPENDS ON HOW COURTS READ THE PROVISIONS IN LIGHT OF
INFORMED CONSENT AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK RULES
Some states include an additional duty for operators based on
the presence of dangerous conditions. California, Colorado,
Florida, and New Mexico limit waiver of liability when the opera-
tor knows or should know of a dangerous condition on the land
or in the facilities or equipment used during space flight activi-
ties.88 This dangerous condition exception expands the scope of
liability an operator owes to an SFP beyond that of gross negli-
gence or willful or wanton conduct. As defined by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, a defendant is liable for harm caused
by dangerous conditions when it: (1) “knows or by the exercise
of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should re-
alize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm”; (2) “should
expect [the person] will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves”; and (3) “fails to exercise reasona-
ble care to protect” the person from danger.89 The dangerous
condition exception thus establishes a distinct duty owed by the
operator to SFPs to exercise reasonable care to discover danger-
ous conditions on land (including prior to launch and upon re-
entry and landing), in any facility where activities under the
launch license take place (including any training facility, launch
facility, and the space vehicle itself), and in the equipment used
87 Id.
88 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212(c)(3) (West Supp. 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-6-
101(1)(b)(II) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501(2)(b)(2) (West 2016); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2013). The statutes are nearly identically
worded. For example, California’s dangerous condition provision applies when
the operator “[h]as actual knowledge or reasonably should have known of a dan-
gerous condition on the land or in the facilities or equipment used in space flight
activities and the dangerous condition proximately causes injury, damage, or
death to the participant.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 2212(c)(3).
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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during the time covered by the license (including maintenance
and inspection of equipment manufactured by a third party).
The dangerous condition exception’s second element asks
whether the operator “should expect that [SFPs] will not dis-
cover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it.”90 How courts interpret the relationship between the
dangerous condition exception and the informed consent re-
quirement will likely determine whether an SFP can ever satisfy
the burden of proof for this second element. An operator seek-
ing to avoid liability could make a strong case that the specific
informed consent provisions required by the FAA make it im-
possible for the operator to violate the second element. The
FAA’s rule mandates that the informed consent disclosure in-
cludes information “[t]hat there are hazards that are not
known” inherent to space flight.91 If an SFP acknowledges that
unknown risks exist, it could relieve the operator of liability,
since the SFP may have assumed the risk that dangerous condi-
tions are present and acknowledged an appreciation of those
dangers by giving informed consent.92 If a court strictly followed
the Restatement definition, an SFP might prevail on an interpre-
tation that the second element’s two clauses are disjunctive.93
Read literally, an operator could still be liable if the SFP discov-
ers the risk and realizes the danger yet fails to protect them-
selves against it.
For launches covered by the California, Colorado, Florida,
and New Mexico statutes,94 courts will have to resolve the ten-
sion between the state legislatures’ intent that operators owe a
90 Id. § 343(b).
91 14 C.F.R. § 460.45(a)(2) (2007).
92 See APT RESEARCH, INC., supra note 53, at 3 (stating that the FAA informed
consent rule represents a “cognizance test” or an “affirmation that the space
flight participant understands what he or she is getting into before embarking on
a mission”) (citations omitted).
93 The Restatement crucially says “will not discover . . . or will fail to protect
themselves.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(b).
94 Interpreting how much risk an SFP assumes by complying with federal in-
formed consent requirements is further complicated by the fact that two states
with dangerous condition exceptions also contain express assumption of risk pro-
visions. The Florida liability statute requires an SFP to sign a warning that in-
cludes “assuming the risk of participating in this spaceflight activity” (though the
rest of the warning may limit this to “inherent risks”). FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 331.501(2)–(3) (West 2016). The Colorado statute contains similar language,
requiring a signed agreement and warning that an SFP “assume[s] the inherent
risk of participating in this spaceflight activity.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-6-101(3)
(2012).
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duty of reasonable care under the dangerous condition excep-
tion on one hand and the federal government’s intent that SFPs
assume some risk through waivers and informed consent agree-
ments on the other hand. A court could resolve this conflict by
declaring that a state-level dangerous condition exception is pre-
empted by the Act’s language that a state “may not adopt or
have in effect a law, regulation, standard, or order inconsistent
with” the federal informed consent requirement.95 Or a court
could interpret a state’s dangerous condition exception as con-
sistent with the second part of the preemption provision, which
provides that states may adopt a law that is “in addition to or
more stringent than a requirement of, or regulation prescribed
under” the Act.96 Because it is unclear what exactly the preemp-
tion clause means by “more stringent” than federal law, courts
conducting their preemption analysis could reach opposite find-
ings on the validity of state dangerous condition exceptions.97
One court could interpret the dangerous condition exception as
a “more stringent” safety protection for SFPs (thus allowed by
the preemption clause), and another court could decide the ex-
ception is “inconsistent” with SFP–operator liability waivers
(thus prohibited by the preemption clause).
Potential conflicts between the Act and state laws pose thorny
questions for the courts’ preemption analyses, and there is no
“rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern”
to resolve whether Congress intended to preempt other state
waiver provisions with the Act’s informed consent require-
ments.98 When the text of a federal statute does not provide a
“clear or explicit” answer to resolve the conflict, courts generally
start with a “presumption in favor of local law in cases dealing
with areas traditionally regulated by states.”99 Predicting how
courts might ultimately resolve these preemption questions is
beyond the scope of this Comment,100 but it is important to ac-
knowledge the inconsistencies and conflicts between state and
federal regulations when considering future paths for reform.
Ultimately, increasing the clarity and consistency of the liability
95 See 51 U.S.C. § 50919(c)(1) (2012).
96 Id. § 50919(c)(2).
97 See Blasingame, supra note 67, at 777–78.
98 Id. at 771.
99 Id. at 772.
100 For an in-depth discussion of possible preemption analysis outcomes, see
Blasingame, supra note 67, at 768–87.
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regime will likely require substantive changes to both state and
federal law.
C. “INHERENT RISK” PROVISIONS MAY PROVIDE COMMERCIAL
OPERATORS COMPLETE IMMUNITY IN SOME STATES
One final state-level provision defining the scope of liability is
the exception that operators are not liable for injury due to “in-
herent risks,” contained in the Florida and New Mexico stat-
utes.101 Florida’s statute provides that an SFP cannot bring an
action for injury or death “resulting from the inherent risks of
spaceflight activities,” subject to limitation by an operator’s will-
ful or wanton disregard for safety, the dangerous condition ex-
ception, or an intentional injury.102 New Mexico’s statute is
nearly identically worded.103 These inherent risk provisions do
not, and cannot, clearly establish when they will prevent SFPs
from bringing a claim because the inherent risks of space travel
are unknown.104 If a claim is filed against an operator in a scena-
rio where a yet-to-be-identified phenomena causes a fatal acci-
dent, how are the parties and courts to determine whether an
unknown risk is an “inherent” risk?
Both statutes raise complex causation and burden of persua-
sion questions by linking the inherent risk provision (which lim-
its the operator’s liability) with a gross negligence, dangerous
condition, and/or intentional tort exception (which increases
the operator’s liability). If an SFP makes a prima facie case for
gross negligence, is the defense of an inherent risk an affirma-
tive defense for the operator, or must it still negate each claim
of negligence by the SFP? Or does the statute’s assumption that
an accident is the result of an inherent risk (unless proven negli-
gent) constitute the existence of a “no duty” case, such that the
court would decide as a matter of law that the defendant is not
liable?105
101 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501(2)(a) (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3(A)
(LexisNexis 2013).
102 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.501(2).
103 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3(A)–(B).
104 Knutson, supra note 51, at 117; George C. Nield et al., Informed Consent in
Commercial Space Transportation Safety, IAC-13-D5.1.4, 64 INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL
CONG., at 3, 5 (2013), http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_of
fices/ast/programs/international_affairs/media/Informed_Consent_paper_IAC
_Sept_2013_FAAfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH7A-VDPK].
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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New Mexico’s statute further complicates this inquiry by bar-
ring claims when an injury or death results “exclusively from any
of the inherent risks” of space travel.106 The exclusivity require-
ment makes litigating inherent risk even more complex, as a
court must decide: whether an exclusive inherent risk refers to a
single causal event requiring proof of but-for causation; whether
more than one proximate cause could still exist; whether proof
of causation could be established by inference; and whether a
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies the burden of
proof necessary to demonstrate an exclusive cause of an
accident.107
How courts will inevitably interpret state statutes in light of
federally-mandated liability waivers is unknown, given no cases
have yet litigated these provisions. Passengers that turn to state
courts in the case of an accident face an uncertain legal land-
scape that complicates application of traditional state negli-
gence doctrines.
IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM—A FORWARD-LOOKING
LIABILITY REGIME THAT REGULATES THE
COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY AS A
FORM OF TRANSPORTATION
Commercial space transportation operators will soon bring
private citizens to space, potentially as early as the next few
years. Congress and the states should act to resolve the host of
problems identified in Parts II and III that plague the liability
regime, ideally by the time commercial operators begin regular
flights with private passengers. Federally-mandated cross-waivers
of liability and informed consent provisions create a compli-
cated patchwork of laws insufficient to protect SFP safety when
overlaid with state negligence-based liability statutes.
This Comment proposes a simpler liability regime—states
should regulate commercial space transportation under the
same negligence doctrines that apply to other forms of public
transportation. In most states, this will impose a duty of reasona-
ble care, defined by the standard of what a reasonably prudent
operator would do under the same or similar circumstances. In
106 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-3(A) (emphasis added).
107 The Restatement (Third) of Torts explains that the “civil burden of proof
merely requires a preponderance of the evidence, and the existence of other,
plausible causal sets that cannot be ruled out does not, by itself, preclude the
plaintiff from satisfying the burden of proof on causation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. b.
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a few states, this may resemble common carrier duties, which
hold operators to the highest standard of care. Either negli-
gence standard would be a marked improvement over the status
quo, where the standard of care owed by operators to SFPs is
unnecessarily lax, legally unclear, or both. Eliminating the fed-
erally mandated SFP–operator cross-waiver requirement would
remove the legal shield that prevents operators from bearing
the financial burden for their own negligent acts. Traditional
state negligence doctrines should fill in and allow SFPs to bring
suits against operators who fail to meet the appropriate standard
of care when accidents occur. The Act’s cross-waiver require-
ments currently expire in 2025,108 though ideally, Congress
should repeal these requirements before the first commercial
space flights carry private citizens. Alternatively, if amending the
current Act is politically infeasible, Congress should not renew
these provisions when authorizing the Act for the post-2025
period.
A. EXPANDING TORT PROTECTIONS—THE DUTY OF OPERATORS
AND A CASE FOR IMPOSING COMMON CARRIER OR
“REASONABLY PRUDENT OPERATOR” LIABILITY
Tort law serves important social goals by compensating in-
jured victims and incentivizing behavioral changes in private ac-
tors to avoid negligent acts and to purchase insurance to hedge
against the potential financial costs of liability.109 Negligence
suits are an important vehicle for achieving these ends.110 The
restorative function of tort law rests on the principle that a negli-
gent party should pay the costs for harm it inflicts on other par-
ties.111 This restorative function is compensatory, and it follows
that a party should carry liability insurance sufficient to satisfy
the goal of making the injured party whole.112 Allowing negli-
gence suits against operators protects the interests of SFPs by
ensuring operators carry sufficient insurance to pay out claims
in case of an accident to compensate for their loses. This legal
relationship allocates the responsibilities for and costs of an ac-
108 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b)(1)(C) (Supp. | 2016).
109 Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 337, 360 (1990).
110 Id. at 324–25, 328.
111 Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, 58 MOD. L. REV. 820, 820
(1995).
112 Schwartz, supra note 109, at 328.
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cident proportionate to the actor’s contribution to possible
risks.
Defining the scope of liability still requires establishing the
bounds of the legal relationship between two parties by clearly
defining the applicable duties and standards of care. Duty gen-
erally refers to the “fact that [an] actor is required to conduct
himself in a particular manner” towards another party.113 Tort
law imposes liability on an actor when it owes a duty to another,
it breaches the standard of care imposed by that duty, and that
breach causes injury to the party to whom the duty is owed.114
Establishing that an actor owes any duty to another party is the
predicate requirement for any claim for negligence.115 When an
actor owes a duty, the next question is what standard of care
flows from that duty.116 This section will discuss what duty com-
mercial space operators owe to SFPs and the appropriate stan-
dard of care the law should require to fulfill that duty.
The duty owed by an operator to an SFP depends on the na-
ture of the relationship between the two parties, which deter-
mines the type of conduct the operator must engage in or
refrain from.117 No single conception of this relationship exists,
as a result of diverging—and sometimes contradictory—charac-
terizations of the emerging commercial space industry by U.S.
regulators. One view sees private space travel as merely a new
form of adventure tourism.118 The other view treats the industry
as a new frontier for transportation.119 Members of the Senate
and House Committees responsible for these regulations have
long espoused these conflicting views of the industry they are
tasked with regulating.120
Legal regimes that regulate the industry solely as tourism at
the exclusion of transportation inherently fail to account for the
full range of future commercial space operations, since there is
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
114 Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1501, 1501 (2006).
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 Whether a particular relationship “supports a duty of care is a question of
law for the court.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
118 Knutson, supra note 51, at 109.
119 See, e.g., Mineiro, supra note 12, at 373.
120 Timothy R. Hughes & Esta Rosenberg, Space Travel Law (and Politics): The
Evolution of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 31 J. SPACE L. 1,
41, 46–47 (2005).
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no single purpose or business model driving development of the
industry.121 For example, commercial operators are developing
different technologies for different applications, some of which,
like point-to-point travel, are indistinguishable from current
transportation in terms of the relationship between the operator
and the passenger.122 The liability regime should recognize the
transportation functions of commercial space travel and Con-
gress should define the relationship between operators and SFPs
taking this into account.
A duty for operators to treat SFPs as passengers appropriately
recognizes the special relationship between the parties. Estab-
lishing that commercial space operators owe a special duty to
SFPs as passengers then gives rise to the standard of care owed,
departure from which constitutes negligence. Two possible con-
ceptions for the duty are that of a reasonable operator or of a
common carrier, and the standard of care owed would differ
depending on which duty relationship state legislatures or
courts adopt.123 Either conception would raise the standard of
care owed by operators to SFPs over current law by allowing pas-
sengers to bring suits against negligent operators.
1. Operators as Common Carriers and the Highest Standard of Care
Commercial space operators fit within traditional definitions
that courts apply when deciding whether a party owes the duties
of a common carrier to its passengers. Early American common
law classified common carriers as any private company that of-
fered transportation services to the general public.124 An early
working definition focused on the nature of the party offering
the service, defining a common carrier as “one who by virtue of
his calling undertakes, for hire, to transport persons . . . from
one place to another, for all who choose to employ him.”125 As
technological advances gave rise to new forms of transportation,
courts extended the duties of common carriers to each new
mode, from stagecoaches, to railroads, and eventually to air-
121 See Walter Peeters, From Suborbital Space Tourism to Commercial Personal Spacef-
light, 66 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 1625, 1631 (2010).
122 Id. at 1630–31 (describing point-to-point trips where passengers will fly
“prime trajector[ies]” like New York–Tokyo in ninety minutes).
123 See Knutson, supra note 51, at 113.
124 Reuben Leslie Maynard, The Liability of the Common Carrier as Insurer, in
HISTORICAL THESES AND DISSERTATIONS COLLECTION 5 (Cornell U. L. Sch., Paper
188, 1891).
125 Id.
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planes.126 Courts reasoned that the public needs higher levels of
protection when the methods of transportation are undevel-
oped, justifying a higher duty and standard of care imposed on
the carrier.127 To determine if a pilot should be held as a com-
mon carrier, courts asked if the “product and service are availa-
ble to the public generally” and if the carrier “hold[s] himself
ready to serve the public.”128 This “holding out” test depends on
a number of factors, including having an established place of
business, a public offering of services, regular charges and fees,
and undertaking the service as a business rather than as a “cas-
ual or occasional undertaking.”129 When commercial space op-
erators begin regular service to customers, they will likely meet
these factors.
Courts hold common carriers to a “higher degree of care . . .
consistent with the mode of conveyance used and the practical
operation” of the business.130 For commercial space operators,
this standard of care likely represents the care they would exer-
cise anyway. These companies have every incentive to exercise
the highest care possible, given the enormous financial invest-
ments already expended developing their operations and space
vehicles. Public opinion could sharply turn against the entire
industry in the case of an accident if an operator was found to
have acted recklessly or negligently.131 Because passenger safety
is absolutely critical to positive outcomes from early endeavors,
operators do not have room for error. This incentivizes compa-
nies to work together to ensure that high standards become in-
dustry custom.132 A commercial space company must exercise a
high level of care to survive, and the law should reflect that to
support the trajectory the industry must inevitably take to
flourish.
California is one possible state that could apply common car-
rier duties to commercial space operators. Notably, California’s
commercial space liability statute is located within its Civil Code
chapter titled “Common Carriers.”133 State courts have held op-
126 Louis Shanfeld, Airplanes as Common Carriers, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 148,
148–49 (1933).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 149.
129 Jackson v. Stancil, 116 S.E.2d 817, 824–25 (N.C. 1960).
130 Mineiro, supra note 12, at 377.
131 See Knutson, supra note 51, at 119 n.55 (stating the “industry wide result”
will be “an implosion of sorts”).
132 Id.
133 See CAL. CIV. CODE div. 3, pt. 4, tit. 7, ch. 5, art. 5 Note (West Supp. 2019).
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erators liable as common carriers even when dealing with a new
industry or recreational transportation.134 The California Su-
preme Court, in an early case holding a pilot liable as a common
carrier, noted that “it is not a reason for applying different rules
of liability to say that [the craft] and the industry [are] new.”135
The court also held that a recreational purpose does not defeat
a finding of common carrier obligations because there is no rea-
son a passenger’s motive should “make any difference as to the
degree of responsibility” put on the carrier.136
2. “Reasonably Prudent Operators” and the Standard of Care
Another way to conceptualize the duty commercial space op-
erators could owe their passengers draws from the Restatement
(Third) of Torts approach to special relationships, which im-
poses a duty of reasonable care “with regard to risks that arise
within the scope of the relationship.”137 The Restatement lists a
carrier’s relationship with its passengers as the first example of a
special relationship that gives rise to a duty of reasonable
care.138
A “reasonably prudent” operator acts negligently when it does
not “exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.”139
This standard of care takes into account “the foreseeable likeli-
hood that the [operator’s] conduct will result in harm, the fore-
seeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”140 Many
courts have long adopted this approach, as described by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., which bal-
ances the probability and severity of the harm against the bur-
den required to avoid it.141 Expressed algebraically, an operator
is liable for negligence when B < P x L, where B is the burden of
taking “adequate precautions,” P is the probability of an acci-
dent occurring, and L is the magnitude of the harm.142 An oper-
ator would thus breach the standard of reasonable care where
134 Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 934 (Cal. 1932).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 935.
137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 40(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
138 Id. § 40(b)(1).
139 See id. § 3.
140 See id.
141 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
142 Id.
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the burden of taking precautions is less than the extent of harm.
In the case of commercial space transportation, data exist to
help operators, regulators, and courts determine the severity of
risks SFPs might face (L) and the probability of space accidents
and injuries (P).143
B. A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE WOULD BETTER PROTECT
THE INTERESTS OF SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS AND
COMMERCIAL OPERATORS
A liability regime based on either common carrier or reasona-
bly prudent operator standards of care will provide more legal
clarity to both operators and SFPs. SFPs or their heirs should be
able to bring negligence suits in the case of serious injury or
death to compensate them for their losses. Operators should be
subjected to a set of liability rules that courts are already familiar
applying. The current patchwork of federally-mandated cross-
waivers and informed consent requirements layered on top of
differing state statutes serves neither the goal of protecting SFPs’
interests nor providing certainty to operators for when they
might be held liable in the case of an accident.
Traditional negligence approaches better ensure that SFPs
are compensated in case of an accident and that operators carry
enough insurance to cover losses should they fail to exercise the
appropriate standard of care. First, operators are better situated
to insure against the risk of SFP injury than each potential pri-
vate passenger. One assumption behind the current regime is
that SFPs are likely to be extremely wealthy and could thus af-
ford the cost of purchasing their own private insurance.144 How-
ever, SFPs may not be able to purchase insurance because it is
unavailable on the market or because individual policies may be
too expensive.145 Early SFPs may not be able to purchase insur-
ance at all due to lack of market offerings, since the pool of
insureds may not be “large enough to be profitable for insurers
underwriting policies.”146 Even if a market develops for private
space travel insurance, it could still be unaffordable for SFPs to
143 Christopher D. Johnson, The Texas Space Flight Liability Act and Efficient Regu-
lation for the Private Commercial Space Flight Era, 92 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 226, 230–33
(2013).
144 See Matthew Schaefer, The Intersection of Insurance Markets and Liability Re-
gimes Regarding Third-Parties and Space Flight Participants in Commercial Space Activi-
ties, 57 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 407, 419 (2014).
145 Id. at 411, 419.
146 Id. at 411.
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pay to insure all of the possible risks they currently bear legal
responsibility for. At least one company has proposed a private
policy for SFPs that covers death and serious injury up to $5
million per passenger.147 This policy could cost at least
$100,000, or approximately 50% of the deposit price to travel
with Virgin Galactic.148 There will likely be passengers such as
researchers, teachers, or students that cannot afford to purchase
an individual policy.149 Imposing the full cost of insurance on
SFPs could price out potential passengers who are not billion-
aires. Operators may also be better situated to acquire liability
coverage by working directly with insurance companies than pri-
vate individuals. Not only could operators foster business good-
will with SFPs, they would be able to purchase coverage for a
larger number of insureds, providing underwriters with addi-
tional risk data and a large enough pool to better spread their
risks.150
Second, opponents of greater operator liability overstate the
risk that shifting more of the liability insurance costs to opera-
tors will financially harm the emerging industry.151 Members of
Congress who advance this argument cite no studies or data to
support this claim.152 Given the uncertainty over when operators
may be liable for injury or death to an SFP, financially conserva-
tive and risk adverse companies may choose to take on the extra
financial cost by electing to include coverage for these risks to
SFPs anyway.153
Third, legal uncertainty itself poses potentially the greatest
risk to the industry. Managing early liability for passengers is
critical because industry growth “depends on attracting new cus-
tomers beyond early adopters.”154 The “media-sensitive” space
industry may reasonably calculate that legal fights after a major
accident could turn public opinion and harm the industry far
more than paying the actual costs for additional insurance cov-
147 Id. at 418. Ironshore International’s Pembroke Managing Agency Limited
(a syndicate of Lloyd’s) proposed the policy. Id.
148 Id. at 419; O’Callaghan, supra note 5.
149 161 CONG. REC. H3511, 3526 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Rep.
Rohrabacher).
150 Cf. Schaefer, The Intersection of Insurance Markets, supra note 143, at 410–11.
151 See, e.g., id. at 419, 421.
152 See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. H3511, 3531 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of
Rep. Smith).
153 Denis Bensoussan, Space Tourism Risks: A Space Insurance Perspective, 66 ACTA
ASTRONAUTICA 1633, 1636 (2010).
154 FAA EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 15.
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erage.155 Industry players and academics alike agree that a space
accident will be inevitable at some point.156 If an operator mis-
calculates the amount of liability it owes other parties, it could
end up purchasing an insufficient amount of insurance to cover
potential losses.157 A surprise adverse ruling in state court, com-
bined with likely having to ground operations after an accident,
could cripple a company as the industry begins full service.158
C. TRADITIONAL STATE TORT LIABILITY PROVIDES A BETTER
OPTION FOR REFORM THAN PROPOSALS FOR COMPLETE
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
The current regime governing operator liability for SFPs is
unnecessarily complicated. Its rules and regulations are incom-
plete, unclear, untested, and sometimes contradictory. Applying
traditional state negligence doctrines would better protect SFP
safety by setting clear duties and standards of care based on fa-
miliar common law approaches to the transportation industry.
Courts will inevitably be presented with a personal injury suit
from a private space accident, and the common carrier and Re-
statement (Third) of Torts special relationship approaches pro-
vide two possible doctrines for courts to apply to a currently
blank slate of law.
These negligence doctrines, while not perfect, are preferable
to resolving these problems through federal preemption of state
tort law. Several academics propose that the federal government
should preempt state tort claims altogether, “precluding both
negligence and gross negligence claims.”159 This regime fails to
appropriately spread the risks of a serious accident. It would
leave SFPs to bear all of the risks, even when losses are due to an
operator’s reckless or negligent conduct. The rationale set forth
for shifting the industry’s risk onto passengers is unpersuasive.
The claim that “the nascent industry” needs to avoid “crushing
liability . . . to place the industry on a level playing field with
155 Cf. Bensoussan, supra note 152, at 1636.
156 See, e.g., id.; Knutson, supra note 51, at 112 n.29 (stating that the loss rate
will be “at least 1 in 200 and probably more like 1 in 50”).
157 Cf. Bensoussan, supra note 152, at 1635–36.
158 See id.
159 Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption, supra note 22, at 263. The author
further argues that state tort “suits by SFPs against commercial space companies
should be barred by the federal government except in cases of willful miscon-
duct, or alternatively, the lower standard of gross negligence.” Id. at 229; see also
Justin Silver, Note, Houston, We Have a (Liability) Problem, 112 MICH. L. REV. 833,
856 (2014).
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foreign competitors” understates the maturity of the U.S. indus-
try and overstates the financial risk of assigning liability to SFPs
for their own negligence.160 The industry is quite mature by a
number of criteria, including decades of cutting-edge expertise,
market growth in the hundreds of billions of dollars, substantial
financial protection provided by the federal indemnification re-
gime, and government contracts that provide stable demand for
services.161 Even if the industry did have to pay out claims to
high-net worth passengers, it is unlikely that the risk cited, “sev-
eral hundred million dollars,”162 would be the determining fac-
tor for whether or not a company survives financially after a
major accident. The Act already requires that operators hold up
to $600 million in insurance to cover claims for third-party and
government losses.163 An operator’s total financial assets at stake
could run in the billions of dollars. Without a much more de-
tailed accounting of the total assets and liabilities involved in a
typical launch, there is little to no evidence to support the claim
that the cost of covering liability for SFPs would doom the indus-
try financially.164 The House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology did not even hold hearings on the Act’s SFP liability
cross-waiver provisions.165
Federal preemption as currently proposed is also practically
unworkable, since there is no general federal tort law for courts
to apply in place of state law. Theoretically, Congress could pre-
empt the states by creating a more stringent liability regime—
adopting a higher standard of care modeled on common carrier
160 Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption, supra note 22, at 273; Silver, supra
note 159, at 857.
161 See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. H3511, 3514–15 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (state-
ments of Rep. Pelosi and Rep. Johnson); Shane Chaddha, U.S. Commercial Space
Sector: Matured and Successful, 36 J. SPACE L. 19, 19–20, 30–31, 51 (2010).
162 Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption, supra note 22, at 262. No citation is
provided to support an estimated burden of this magnitude.
163 51 U.S.C. § 50914(a)(3)(A) (2012).
164 One proposal for federal preemption asserts that “the potential burden of
tort costs is proportionally larger” for the commercial space industry than it was
for railroads and airlines. Silver, supra note 159, at 838. The study provided via
footnote does not substantiate this claim, merely indicating that the number of
tort suits against British railroads rose as the number of passenger rose in the
mid-1800s. See id. at 838 n.31. It stops short of demonstrating that the increase in
lawsuits left the railroad industry with unbearable financial liabilities or that the
total liability burden would be greater for space operators. No evidence is pro-
vided about the relatively liability burden of operators vis-a`-vis airlines. See id.
165 161 CONG. REC. H3511, 3515 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Rep.
Johnson).
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or reasonably prudent operator duties. However, Congress
would have to create a source of federal law to govern potential
negligence cases, which it has shown no interest in doing.166 Pre-
emption could resolve the current patchwork of federal and
state regulations by creating more uniformity in the law, but ab-
sent any evidence of political will to ratchet up legal protections,
preemption proposals fail to address the serious liability gaps for
SFPs. Operators should be held financially responsible for their
negligence, not passengers. A stronger state negligence ap-
proach may be more expensive for the industry in the case of a
catastrophic accident, but as Representative Johnson explained
during debates over the Act, “[t]here won’t be any passengers
when they find out that they have no protection.”167 Congress
should reform the Act to facilitate greater protection for SFPs
under state negligence doctrines, not less.
V. CONCLUSION
The current liability regime governing SFP safety is not sus-
tainable in the long run. Shifting almost all the financial risks of
an accident to the SFP leaves passengers to bear the cost of the
industry’s development. Setting aside any moral consideration
about whether this distribution of risk is fair and equitable, it
raises serious practical concerns for an industry that requires
public support to survive. Congress should remove the
SFP–operator cross-waiver mandate as a condition of operator
launch licenses as soon as possible. This would give states more
flexibility to apply the negligence regimes that are well devel-
oped for other forms of transportation to the commercial space
industry. To avoid the potential for intractable litigation over
conflicting federal and state liability regimes, Congress should
amend the Act before the first SFPs travel to space. If the bu-
reaucratic realities of the legislative process make changes in the
short term infeasible, Congress should let the SFP-related liabil-
ity requirements expire in 2025. The commercial space indus-
try’s rapid developments however make it likely that the first
private passengers will travel to space well before 2025. If Con-
gress fails to reform the liability regime before the first SFPs
travel to space, the industry and its passengers must hope they
beat the odds that a fatal accident will not occur during this
period of regulatory uncertainty.
166 See id. at 3520 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
167 Id. at 3515 (statement of Rep. Johnson).
